I close my series on Cost Estimating Theatre with a review of the Planning Fallacy, thoughts on whether accepting it is pragmatic or depressing, the reasonableness of expecting to “bend the cost curve,” and the implications for the U.S. Navy of predictably inaccurate estimates of cost and schedule for major projects.

The Planning Fallacy can be summed up with a paraphrase of Hamlet, “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your [acquisition plan]” (Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 5). This post describes the CBO’s cost estimating methodology.

My second encounter with reference classes and the Planning Fallacy

The biggest resistance to a strategy to reduce the impact of the Planning Fallacy is likely to be denial of the selected reference class. This post describes my shield meltdown over references classes.

US weapons system are increasingly late to complete, and exceed projected costs. This post is an introduction to the Planning Fallacy.

The Navy’s schedule and cost estimates for new warships are “accuracy challenged.” This applies to almost all project estimates. This is the first post of a series that seeks to understand why.